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Approved For Release 2003/05/03 : CIA-RDP89R01731R003300180034-4

**SECURITY INFORMATION**

IS 82908

Copy 3 of 4 copies

2 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Policy Coordination

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Development of a National Psychological Strategy

1. Attached hereto is a copy of a memorandum which I have just received from the PSB and which purports to summarize the conclusions reached at the conference which I attended on 19 December at the PSB. You will note that it took eleven drafts to arrive at this two-page memorandum, which is some indication of the difficulties which Admiral Stevens and the members of the PSB staff had in reducing the thoughts and recommendations expressed at the meeting to an agreed document. Admiral Stevens has explained to me that one of the difficulties which he experienced in this connection was in convincing the PSB staff that the development of a national psychological strategy can be accomplished only through the contribution of major portions of the effort by the operating departments and agencies most concerned. The opposing philosophy had it that vigorous, fresh minds should take the laboring oar, but Admiral Stevens has indicated that he has substantially succeeded in putting over his point and that the memorandum substantially reflects this.

2. This memorandum should be considered by [ ] staff with the assistance of yourself and [ ] in order that I may make an appropriate reply to the PSB. This is a matter of some urgency and considerable importance, as I am sure you realize. If we agree with the substance of the paper, we should so notify the PSB and at the same time we should indicate what member of our staff will be available to work with the designees of the Department of State and the PSB, etc. It is for OPC to decide who our representatives shall be, but I should think that we should name a person who is familiar with our major capabilities both present and future. Probably this man will require the extensive assistance of at least three of your area divisions: namely, EE, FE, and NEA. It would seem to me that either [ ] or [ ] could do the job for us and there are good reasons why each of them should be selected.

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3. In our reply we should also suggest that the PSB should continue to monitor the effort. You will note that no reference to PSB is contained in the concluding paragraph. I am informed that the PSB would regard it as a helpful and friendly gesture on our part to make this recommendation. Apparently the language of the concluding paragraph was devised by Admiral Stevens in an effort to bind Messrs. Bohlen, Nitze and myself into the reviewing group -- but specific reference to PSB as such was lost sight of in the process.

4. Although I do not consider it to be a fault of the paper submitted by PSB, no reference was made to the several statements and recommendations which I advanced. I pointed out that in our view any comprehensive strategic plan should provide in some way for the determination of priorities as between areas and types of operation; priorities in the application of our national assets; and at least a general estimate of the yearly budget for the several major segments of the effort. These are all very real and practical problems which are confronting CIA at the present time and, as you know, it has been our hope that the PSB would serve as the mechanism for reaching or confirming determinations of this kind. I believe that we could adequately cover these points in our memorandum of reply commenting on the paper submitted so as to call attention one more time to the importance and urgency of these problems. I am inclined to agree with Admiral Stevens that these particular exercises on the part of PSB will have to be conducted separately from the formulation of the basic strategy; but in such case they should follow immediately upon the heels thereof.

5. The following additional thoughts which were advanced during the course of the discussion are of some interest, although admittedly they apply to the actual consideration of the strategy itself rather than the determination of how to set about developing the strategy. The latter is the present exercise. Mr. Bohlen expressed the view that we are still very much in the phase of containment with relatively little that can be positively accomplished behind the Iron Curtain for the moment in forcing the retraction there of Soviet power and influence. The timing is not yet ripe for revolution, but preparations should be made against the day when the development of events, including the build-up of the military strength of the West, will render it more propitious to strike heavy blows within the actual Soviet orbit. Mr. Bohlen estimated that probably one result of the review would be to point up the fact that the priorities lie in the direction of strengthening and saving the most heavily threatened areas of the free world; for example, Southeast Asia and Iran, and other areas of the Middle East.

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6. Mr. Nitze expressed the opinion that a hardening or reinforcing of the Iron Curtain from our side might have some effect in slowing down technological developments within the USSR, but he said that Russian vulnerabilities to economic strangulation are not great. Serious economic stresses and vulnerabilities exist with respect to all of the satellites, which are definitely suffering from the cutting-off of East-West trade. The freeze-up of commodities and manufactured items from the West, coupled with the Soviet vacuum cleaner on the other side, have produced stresses and strains of the greatest magnitude, the further intensification of which might in some cases result in the total collapse of satellite economy.

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

FRANK. G. WISNER

Encl (1)

Copy #4 (of 7) of memo from  
SP Ass't to Dir., PSB, dated  
28 Dec. attaching draft memo  
of conf. of 19 Dec.

DD/P-FCW/bjm

Orig. and 1 - addressee, with encl. *Copies 1 & 2*  
cc: 1 - ER (without encl) - *copy # 3* ✓  
1 - DD/P chrono (without encl) *copy # 4*

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**NOV 30 1951**

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Proposed National Psychological Strategy Paper

1. I have given considerable attention to the tentative paper prepared by the Psychological Strategy Board on the problem of formulating a national psychological strategy. As you know, OPC was asked to consider those portions of the tentative paper concerning the feasibility and desirability of either detaching Satellites from Soviet domination and/or promoting revolution within the USSR itself.

2. It seems to me that (such) an overall strategy is essential and that the PSB is the appropriate agency in the government to supervise the formulation of it. Thus far, our planning and our preparations and our activities with respect to operations against either the Satellites or the USSR have been developed under the very broadest guidance set forth in NSC 68 and now confirmed by NSC 10/5. It has become obvious to us, however, that concrete plans and specific operations require that an overall framework under which such operations might be undertaken be more definitively established. Many questions of the highest national policy are involved as well as a realistic projection of the overall military picture. What this means is that the actual choice of targets and the actual timing of these operations is dependent to a large degree upon conditions outside the responsibility of OPC to influence. Therefore, our operations can become realistic only if they are integrated and related to a strategy guiding the national effort during the course of the next several years.

3. You are well aware of some of the peculiar features of the resistance movements -- namely that they cannot be developed without political motivation or sustained at a high level for any length of time without actively working for the political objective for which they were created. So far we lack guidance as to

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
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the concrete political aims required to inspire a resistance movement and the timing by which the movement would be brought into play. Therefore, I consider it essential that such an overall national cold war strategy be developed at the earliest possible time to assist us in the accomplishment of our chartered mission.

4. I also believe CIA/OPC should participate in the development of such a strategy because its own contribution will influence the broad planning framework. However, we cannot make our fullest contribution in one month, the period tentatively established in the PSB study. I am forwarding along with this memorandum a suggested breakdown of the elements of an overall plan which you may find useful in your discussions with the PSB. A perusal of this breakdown will indicate why more time will be required for its fullest development. Fortunately, we have in process many studies which will readily lend themselves to this purpose. We are prepared to move ahead with these at any rate you suggest.



KILBOURNE JOHNSTON  
Assistant Director for  
Policy Coordination

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November 15, 1951

3 p.m.

WORKING DRAFT ONLY

NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY

→ **PROBLEM:** To formulate a national psychological strategy.

**REFERENCES:** NSC 10/2  
NSC 10/5  
NSC 59/1  
Directive of President, 4 April 1951  
NSC 20/4  
NSC 68 and 114 Series

DISCUSSION:

1. The national policy of the United States seeks to "reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence, and stability of the world family of nations." NSC 68

2. The Psychological Strategy Board is responsible, within the framework of this policy, for the "formulation . . . of over-all national psychological objectives, policies, and programs." By this paper the Board seeks to develop a method for the early formulation of such a national psychological strategy:

a. By requesting responsible departments and agencies to furnish estimates of actions which, (1) in immediately ensuing time, and (2) later, can be effectively taken by them within the framework of national policy;

b. By requesting responsible departments and agencies to furnish current opinions as to the feasibility and desirability of eventually taking the actions outlined in paragraphs 3a. and 3b. below;

c. By study of such estimates and opinions, in consultation with representatives of these departments and agencies.

d. By relating the actions which have been and may be approved as feasible and advantageous into an integrated, overall strategy, to



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be promulgated by the Board.

3. The United States is not presently prepared affirmatively to undertake certain courses of action which would obviously go far towards achieving the national policy:

a. Bringing about successful revolution in the USSR;

b. Bringing about successful revolution in one or more of the satellite countries

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4. If there are weighed only the Soviet atomic capabilities (on target) as now estimated, and the effects upon our domestic economy of our presently-planned defense program, then the most critical period for the free world would appear to lie in the immediately ensuing years. Our national psychological strategy should seek in this critical period: (a) to provide adequate deterrents to Soviet aggressive action, and to counteract the effect of Soviet deception; (b) to reduce Soviet power and influence; and (c) to prepare the way for a lessening of our military expenditures. It should minimize the risk of a general war.

5. Among national objectives recently approved by the National Security Council are the following:

*Quote from 10/5.*

"Place maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power, including the relationships between the USSR, its satellites, and Communist China; and when and where appropriate in the light of U.S. and Soviet capabilities and the risk of war, contribute to the retraction and reduction of Soviet power and influence to limits which no longer constitute a threat to U.S. security.

*ditto*

"Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the peoples and nations of the free world, and increase their capacity and will to resist Soviet domination."

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ACTION TO BE TAKEN:

6. The Department of State, as the responsible department, is requested to furnish to the Board:

a. A brief estimate of what can be done through political action controlled by the Department of State, to achieve (1) in immediately ensuing time, and (2) later, the national objectives stated in paragraph 5. This estimate, with whatever supporting material is readily available, should indicate the relative feasibility, priority, emphasis, and pace of any proposed action.

b. A like estimate of what can be done through other action, including propaganda, controlled by the Department of State, to achieve (1) in immediately ensuing time, and (2) later, the national objectives stated in paragraph 5.

c. An opinion as to the eventual feasibility and desirability of the courses of action indicated in paragraph 3 above.

7. The Central Intelligence Agency (OPC), as the responsible agency, is requested to furnish to the Board:

a. An opinion of the feasibility and desirability of the course of action indicated in paragraph 3b above.



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c. An opinion of the feasibility and desirability of the course of action indicated in paragraph 3a. above, and such plans as may be pertinent in the light of that opinion -- the plans to include the factors mentioned in paragraph 7b. above.

d. A report on progress of attempts to encourage high-level defection and to unite and direct the efforts of those groups of refugees, defectors, and others who have fled the power of the Soviet Union, and


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on the availability of such groups as instruments of United States policy.




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8. The Psychological Strategy Board will coordinate action taken hereunder with the Department of Defense in order to facilitate advance planning for logistic and personnel support later to be required.

9. The estimates, reports, and plans described above should be furnished by the responsible Department and Agency to the Psychological Strategy Board within 30 days following receipt of this paper.

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a feeling of  
inconclusiveness.  
Call Bohlen - what did  
he undertake to do?  
to have State do?

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(DATE) _____	
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REMARKS: <i>Please keep these papers together - Mr. Wiener asked that this be done.</i>	
FROM:	<div></div> O/D/D/P
BUILDING	ROOM NO.

FORM NO. 36-8  
SEP 1948

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